How Trump and Modi's tariff deal leaves Pakistan out in the cold
After months of tension, a single phone call between the US president and Indian prime minister delivered massive tariff relief and renewed strategic partnership while Islamabad's mineral diplomacy falls flat.

Just six months ago, the idea of Donald Trump and Narendra Modi striking a tariff deal without even meeting would have seemed delusional. Yet a single phone conversation transformed months of icy relations into a breakthrough that slashed India facing US tariffs from a punishing 50 per cent to just 18 per cent. While India secured massive relief and a seat at Washington's critical minerals summit, Pakistan found itself conspicuously sidelined despite frantic diplomatic efforts.
The numbers tell the story. Before the deal, Indian steel, pharmaceuticals, textiles and manufactured goods faced a brutal 25 per cent reciprocal tariff plus an additional 25 per cent penalty linked to Russian oil purchases. That 50 per cent wall has now collapsed to 18 per cent. For Indian exporters, this is not symbolism but oxygen. The reciprocal duty vanished. The Russian oil penalty disappeared entirely.
In return, India delivered what Trump values most: big, bankable commitments. New Delhi pledged to halt Russian oil purchases and sharply increase imports of US liquefied natural gas, coal and energy products. India committed to major buying surges across energy, technology and agriculture. Defence and nuclear purchases moved forward. Non tariff barriers came down. A bridge toward a free trade agreement emerged, tied to a 500 billion dollar bilateral trade target by 2030.
Trump made the personal dimension explicit, publicly describing Modi as a close friend. Modi reciprocated warmly, expressing gratitude for relief benefiting "Made in India" exports. This is classic transactional diplomacy, and both leaders clearly like it that way. In Trump's world, personal rapport lubricates deals. Right now, Modi has that channel. Pakistan does not.
Compare India's approach with Pakistan's pitch. Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Army Chief Asim Munir personally showcased rare earth samples. Pakistani officials talked up copper, antimony and rare earth elements from Balochistan, with media campaigns pushing staggering claims of six trillion dollars in untapped mineral wealth.
The problem is credibility. Pakistan's mineral sector produced about 6.5 billion dollars in fiscal year 2020. Mineral exports stayed below one billion dollars. Observers place realistically recoverable potential closer to 100 to 300 billion dollars spread over decades. Even Pakistan's rare earth story looks thin, with reserves between 100,000 and 400,000 tonnes compared to India's seven million tonnes.
India does not sell minerals as a standalone gimmick. India embeds minerals inside a larger industrial vision: domestic exploration, auctioned mineral blocks, overseas lithium acquisitions, processing clusters, dedicated rare earth corridors, manufacturing hubs, electric vehicle supply chains, semiconductor fabs, defence production. Everything links to everything else. Washington does not see India as a miner. Washington sees India as an ecosystem builder.
That is why External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar's presence at the Critical Minerals Ministerial matters so much. It signals that the US sees India as part of the solution to China's processing dominance, not merely a buyer waiting in line but a partner capable of shaping supply chains.
From Trump's perspective, the strategic maths is blunt. India offers scale, market size, political stability, manufacturing ambition and a role in balancing China. Pakistan offers risk, uncertainty and diminishing strategic utility. The Afghanistan era that made Pakistan matter as a logistics corridor has ended. Trump's second term worldview revolves around deals, leverage and optics. India fits that worldview. Pakistan does not.
Geopolitics rarely announces breakups with speeches. It announces them through invitations not sent, calls not returned and deals signed with someone else. Right now, the invitations go to India. The calls go to Modi. The deals go to New Delhi. In South Asia's unforgiving power game, that choice carries consequences.
