India-plus-many: How New Delhi is rewiring commerce in a fragmented world
After walking out of RCEP in 2019, India has turned trade into strategy, building a web of partnerships that place New Delhi at the centre of a multipolar economy
Officials in Delhi say the FTA with GCC will connect India’s manufacturing and services base with the Gulf’s energy and capital resources while opening channels for collaboration in renewable energy, green hydrogen, digital infrastructure and critical minerals.
For India, this is the backbone of a new transcontinental architecture—one that ties directly into the emerging India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the G20 Summit in New Delhi. The trade pact with the UAE is already acting as a hub-spoke model of corridor, especially when the UAE signed similar pacts with 24 more geographies. India is exploring the African and Central Asian markets through these pacts.
By institutionalising tariff reductions, logistics integration and investment mobility, the GCC FTA will lend commercial depth to a corridor designed to move goods, data and clean energy across three continents. Ports such as Mundra, JNPT, Duqm, Jebel Ali, Jeddah and Piraeus could become the arteries of a modern trade route connecting South Asia with Europe through the Gulf.
Jordan is still not part of the GCC, but the trade is effectively liberalised under the Greater Arab FTA, supported by close political, security and investment cooperation. India will have to rely on Riyadh to push for customs harmonisation for IMEC and make it part of GCC-linked Red Sea trade corridors. Arab countries’ relations with Israel and Syria remain a contentious issue.
In November 2019, amidst pressures from domestic lobbies led by RSS affiliate Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM), Prime Minister Narendra Modi walked away from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) meeting in Bangkok. India was accused of missing the bus on Asia’s most ambitious trade pact. Seven years on, that judgement looks outdated. India has not retreated from trade; it has rewritten the rules.
Since exiting RCEP, New Delhi has signed or concluded eight FTAs covering 37 developed countries, including comprehensive pacts with the UAE, Australia, Oman, United Kingdom, European Free Trade Association (EFTA), New Zealand and the European Union. Officials in New Delhi, Washington and Ottawa will tell you that negotiations with the US and Canada have concluded, and have been accelerated with the GCC.
Collectively, these deals represent the emergence of what officials call an ‘India-plus-many’ strategy, a deliberate effort to make India the hub of multiple, overlapping economic partnerships spanning the Gulf, Europe, North America and the Indo-Pacific.
Earlier, India’s FTAs were cautious and commodity-focused, a top official in the commerce ministry said. Now, they are comprehensive, covering investments, technologies, digital trade and sustainability.
Accordingly, the historic pacts with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN are being reviewed to correct widening imbalances and align them with its new-generation FTAs. India’s trade deficit with ASEAN has soared from $5 billion in 2010-11 to $43 billion in 2022-23, and nearly doubled with Japan and South Korea. Officials argue that this is largely due to deeper tariff cuts and limited market access for Indian exports.
The FTA reviews aim to tighten the rules of origin, add safeguard clauses and secure better openings for services and investment. In essence, India is not exiting Asian trade networks but recalibrating them, upgrading old deals to reflect its current strengths in manufacturing, technology and digital services, and ensuring that integration with East Asia is reciprocal, not one-sided.
The shift in the mindset is visible in the numbers. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the UAE, operational since May 2022, has already pushed bilateral trade beyond $100 billion. India’s exports to the UAE rose from about $28 billion in 2021-22 to nearly $37 billion in 2024-25. The Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA), which came into force in December 2022, grants zero-duty access to 96 per cent of Indian goods and is expected to double trade to $50 billion by 2030.
The EFTA agreement, signed in March 2024, broke new ground by linking market access to capital flows. European states Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland pledged $100 billion in investments over 15 years in exchange for tariff concessions. Integrating them with the India-EU trade pact signed last month removes tariffs on 99 per cent of India’s exports to the EU and on 97 per cent of EU exports to India.
India estimates it can unlock more than Rs 6 lakh crore in new export potential over the next few years, especially in textiles, leather, marine products and pharmaceuticals. Indian exporters may benefit from duty reductions of up to 26 per cent in certain categories. Industry associations project that the agreement will double India’s gems and jewellery exports to the EU to $10 billion within three years.
The cherry on the cake is the India-US trade deal. After months of tariff friction that saw US duties on Indian products rise to as high as 50 per cent, the two sides agreed to reset them to an average of 18 per cent. The impact was immediate. Indian exporters in textiles, auto components, engineering goods and pharmaceuticals regained competitiveness. The Sensex jumped 2.6 per cent on the day of announcement and the rupee registered its biggest one-day gain in seven years, reflecting market optimism.
The US is India’s largest export destination, accounting for nearly $76 billion worth of exports in 2024-25. With the tariff reset, exporters expect a further increase of 8-10 per cent in shipments this year. The deal also carries strategic undertones: India committed to diversifying its energy imports towards the US and to expanding cooperation in critical minerals, defence manufacturing and semiconductors.
Commerce minister Piyush Goyal says that in all pacts, including the one with US, India’s agriculture and dairy sectors were fully protected. Canada is next. Canadian prime minister Mark Carney is expected to visit India this March 2026, and both governments are preparing to announce a CEPA during the trip.
The agreement would give India access to Canadian critical minerals, energy resources and clean-technology investments while opening India’s vast consumer market to Canadian goods and services. For New Delhi, a Canadian pact complements the US deal, embedding India more firmly into North American supply chains.
In the Gulf, India has already operationalised CEPAs with the UAE and Oman and is pushing for a bloc-level arrangement with the GCC. A broader GCC pact would integrate energy security, logistics and green-hydrogen cooperation. Broadly, it allows smoother travel of Indian goods in the GCC region.
Pritam Banerjee, who heads the Centre for WTO Studies at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) in New Delhi, says all these agreements have certain design features that distinguish India’s new trade policy from its pre-RCEP approach. The first is asymmetry by design. India offers market access where it gains investment, technology or strategic benefit while retaining long phase-in periods for sensitive sectors such as dairy, agriculture and low-end manufacturing.
The second is precision. The rules of origin have been tightened with strict domestic-value-addition thresholds to prevent third-country circumvention. The third is integration. Modern chapters on digital economy, data governance, professional mobility and sustainability now sit at the core of these pacts.
The numbers tell their own story. India’s merchandise exports reached $475 billion in 2024-25, up 9 per cent from the previous year, while services exports hit a record $375 billion. Non-oil exports to FTA partners have grown 17 per cent faster than those to non-FTA markets. Government estimates suggest that the new generation of trade deals could add 1.5 percentage points to India’s annual GDP growth by 2030.
In sectoral terms, the gains are broad. The textile and apparel industry, which exports about $37 billion annually, expects shipments to the EU and the US to grow by 20-25 per cent as tariffs fall. Marine products and processed foods are gaining ground in the Gulf and ASEAN markets. India’s pharmaceuticals exports, worth $27 billion in 2024, stand to benefit from regulatory cooperation clauses that speed up certification in developed markets. The engineering goods sector, with $110 billion, could be among the largest beneficiaries of new preferential access in Europe and North America.
The impact is global. India’s web of partnerships diversifies risk by creating alternate production and trading corridors that reduce over-reliance on China. Banerjee explains that it builds trust through transparent rules of origin and enforceable standards. It broadens innovation by linking trade with investment and technology transfer, fostering cross-border research and development ecosystems. And it reinforces inclusivity by showing developing economies that it is possible to integrate globally without surrendering policy autonomy.
The India-EU deal alone covers markets representing a quarter of the world GDP. Combined with the US, UK, EFTA, UAE and Australia agreements, India’s preferential trade network now touches partners that together account for nearly 60 per cent of global output and more than half of world trade. For multinational firms seeking diversified and politically stable production bases, India’s scale and democratic stability offer a credible alternative.
However, multiple overlapping FTAs mean exporters must navigate different rulebooks, certificates of origin and compliance regimes. For small and medium enterprises, these administrative costs can dilute benefits. Upgrading logistics, customs automation and quality infrastructure is essential to ensure that tariff preferences translate into real market share gains. The sustainability clauses in Western agreements will also require Indian exporters to invest in greener processes and supply-chain traceability.
Yet the logic of ‘India-plus-many’ is sound. By anchoring its openness in reciprocity, India has made trade liberalisation politically sustainable. SJM national co-convenor and economist Ashwani Mahajan argues that farmers, artisans and small manufacturers are protected through phased schedules while globally competitive industries gain access to vast markets. “This balance of protection and ambition gives India room to open strategically without domestic backlash, a lesson learned from the RCEP experience,” he explains.
By linking Europe, the Gulf, North America and Asia through parallel corridors, India positions itself as a stabilising connector in a world fractured by great-power rivalry. The country’s trade diplomacy has effectively become an instrument of economic statecraft. The emerging picture is of a nation no longer content to follow trade rules set elsewhere. India is writing its own.
Each agreement extends its influence into different spheres—from logistics and energy to technology and sustainability. The web of deals is not just an export strategy but an insurance policy for a world of shifting alliances. Mahajan explains that old globalisation chased scale while the new one prizes trust and diversification.
India’s bet is that in an era of fractured supply chains and contested technologies, trust will be the new tariff advantage. The ‘India-plus-many’ strategy is built for that world—flexible, networked and anchored in sovereignty. Far from retreating, India has re-entered the global trade arena on its own terms. And this time, it is setting the rules.
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Officials in Delhi say the FTA with GCC will connect India’s manufacturing and services base with the Gulf’s energy and capital resources while opening channels for collaboration in renewable energy, green hydrogen, digital infrastructure and critical minerals.
For India, this is the backbone of a new transcontinental architecture—one that ties directly into the emerging India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), unveiled at the G20 Summit in New Delhi. The trade pact with the UAE is already acting as a hub-spoke model of corridor, especially when the UAE signed similar pacts with 24 more geographies. India is exploring the African and Central Asian markets through these pacts.
By institutionalising tariff reductions, logistics integration and investment mobility, the GCC FTA will lend commercial depth to a corridor designed to move goods, data and clean energy across three continents. Ports such as Mundra, JNPT, Duqm, Jebel Ali, Jeddah and Piraeus could become the arteries of a modern trade route connecting South Asia with Europe through the Gulf.
Jordan is still not part of the GCC, but the trade is effectively liberalised under the Greater Arab FTA, supported by close political, security and investment cooperation. India will have to rely on Riyadh to push for customs harmonisation for IMEC and make it part of GCC-linked Red Sea trade corridors. Arab countries’ relations with Israel and Syria remain a contentious issue.
In November 2019, amidst pressures from domestic lobbies led by RSS affiliate Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM), Prime Minister Narendra Modi walked away from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) meeting in Bangkok. India was accused of missing the bus on Asia’s most ambitious trade pact. Seven years on, that judgement looks outdated. India has not retreated from trade; it has rewritten the rules.
Since exiting RCEP, New Delhi has signed or concluded eight FTAs covering 37 developed countries, including comprehensive pacts with the UAE, Australia, Oman, United Kingdom, European Free Trade Association (EFTA), New Zealand and the European Union. Officials in New Delhi, Washington and Ottawa will tell you that negotiations with the US and Canada have concluded, and have been accelerated with the GCC.
Collectively, these deals represent the emergence of what officials call an ‘India-plus-many’ strategy, a deliberate effort to make India the hub of multiple, overlapping economic partnerships spanning the Gulf, Europe, North America and the Indo-Pacific.
Earlier, India’s FTAs were cautious and commodity-focused, a top official in the commerce ministry said. Now, they are comprehensive, covering investments, technologies, digital trade and sustainability.
Accordingly, the historic pacts with Japan, South Korea and ASEAN are being reviewed to correct widening imbalances and align them with its new-generation FTAs. India’s trade deficit with ASEAN has soared from $5 billion in 2010-11 to $43 billion in 2022-23, and nearly doubled with Japan and South Korea. Officials argue that this is largely due to deeper tariff cuts and limited market access for Indian exports.
The FTA reviews aim to tighten the rules of origin, add safeguard clauses and secure better openings for services and investment. In essence, India is not exiting Asian trade networks but recalibrating them, upgrading old deals to reflect its current strengths in manufacturing, technology and digital services, and ensuring that integration with East Asia is reciprocal, not one-sided.
The shift in the mindset is visible in the numbers. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with the UAE, operational since May 2022, has already pushed bilateral trade beyond $100 billion. India’s exports to the UAE rose from about $28 billion in 2021-22 to nearly $37 billion in 2024-25. The Australia Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA), which came into force in December 2022, grants zero-duty access to 96 per cent of Indian goods and is expected to double trade to $50 billion by 2030.
The EFTA agreement, signed in March 2024, broke new ground by linking market access to capital flows. European states Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Iceland pledged $100 billion in investments over 15 years in exchange for tariff concessions. Integrating them with the India-EU trade pact signed last month removes tariffs on 99 per cent of India’s exports to the EU and on 97 per cent of EU exports to India.
India estimates it can unlock more than Rs 6 lakh crore in new export potential over the next few years, especially in textiles, leather, marine products and pharmaceuticals. Indian exporters may benefit from duty reductions of up to 26 per cent in certain categories. Industry associations project that the agreement will double India’s gems and jewellery exports to the EU to $10 billion within three years.
The cherry on the cake is the India-US trade deal. After months of tariff friction that saw US duties on Indian products rise to as high as 50 per cent, the two sides agreed to reset them to an average of 18 per cent. The impact was immediate. Indian exporters in textiles, auto components, engineering goods and pharmaceuticals regained competitiveness. The Sensex jumped 2.6 per cent on the day of announcement and the rupee registered its biggest one-day gain in seven years, reflecting market optimism.
The US is India’s largest export destination, accounting for nearly $76 billion worth of exports in 2024-25. With the tariff reset, exporters expect a further increase of 8-10 per cent in shipments this year. The deal also carries strategic undertones: India committed to diversifying its energy imports towards the US and to expanding cooperation in critical minerals, defence manufacturing and semiconductors.
Commerce minister Piyush Goyal says that in all pacts, including the one with US, India’s agriculture and dairy sectors were fully protected. Canada is next. Canadian prime minister Mark Carney is expected to visit India this March 2026, and both governments are preparing to announce a CEPA during the trip.
The agreement would give India access to Canadian critical minerals, energy resources and clean-technology investments while opening India’s vast consumer market to Canadian goods and services. For New Delhi, a Canadian pact complements the US deal, embedding India more firmly into North American supply chains.
In the Gulf, India has already operationalised CEPAs with the UAE and Oman and is pushing for a bloc-level arrangement with the GCC. A broader GCC pact would integrate energy security, logistics and green-hydrogen cooperation. Broadly, it allows smoother travel of Indian goods in the GCC region.
Pritam Banerjee, who heads the Centre for WTO Studies at the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade (IIFT) in New Delhi, says all these agreements have certain design features that distinguish India’s new trade policy from its pre-RCEP approach. The first is asymmetry by design. India offers market access where it gains investment, technology or strategic benefit while retaining long phase-in periods for sensitive sectors such as dairy, agriculture and low-end manufacturing.
The second is precision. The rules of origin have been tightened with strict domestic-value-addition thresholds to prevent third-country circumvention. The third is integration. Modern chapters on digital economy, data governance, professional mobility and sustainability now sit at the core of these pacts.
The numbers tell their own story. India’s merchandise exports reached $475 billion in 2024-25, up 9 per cent from the previous year, while services exports hit a record $375 billion. Non-oil exports to FTA partners have grown 17 per cent faster than those to non-FTA markets. Government estimates suggest that the new generation of trade deals could add 1.5 percentage points to India’s annual GDP growth by 2030.
In sectoral terms, the gains are broad. The textile and apparel industry, which exports about $37 billion annually, expects shipments to the EU and the US to grow by 20-25 per cent as tariffs fall. Marine products and processed foods are gaining ground in the Gulf and ASEAN markets. India’s pharmaceuticals exports, worth $27 billion in 2024, stand to benefit from regulatory cooperation clauses that speed up certification in developed markets. The engineering goods sector, with $110 billion, could be among the largest beneficiaries of new preferential access in Europe and North America.
The impact is global. India’s web of partnerships diversifies risk by creating alternate production and trading corridors that reduce over-reliance on China. Banerjee explains that it builds trust through transparent rules of origin and enforceable standards. It broadens innovation by linking trade with investment and technology transfer, fostering cross-border research and development ecosystems. And it reinforces inclusivity by showing developing economies that it is possible to integrate globally without surrendering policy autonomy.
The India-EU deal alone covers markets representing a quarter of the world GDP. Combined with the US, UK, EFTA, UAE and Australia agreements, India’s preferential trade network now touches partners that together account for nearly 60 per cent of global output and more than half of world trade. For multinational firms seeking diversified and politically stable production bases, India’s scale and democratic stability offer a credible alternative.
However, multiple overlapping FTAs mean exporters must navigate different rulebooks, certificates of origin and compliance regimes. For small and medium enterprises, these administrative costs can dilute benefits. Upgrading logistics, customs automation and quality infrastructure is essential to ensure that tariff preferences translate into real market share gains. The sustainability clauses in Western agreements will also require Indian exporters to invest in greener processes and supply-chain traceability.
Yet the logic of ‘India-plus-many’ is sound. By anchoring its openness in reciprocity, India has made trade liberalisation politically sustainable. SJM national co-convenor and economist Ashwani Mahajan argues that farmers, artisans and small manufacturers are protected through phased schedules while globally competitive industries gain access to vast markets. “This balance of protection and ambition gives India room to open strategically without domestic backlash, a lesson learned from the RCEP experience,” he explains.
By linking Europe, the Gulf, North America and Asia through parallel corridors, India positions itself as a stabilising connector in a world fractured by great-power rivalry. The country’s trade diplomacy has effectively become an instrument of economic statecraft. The emerging picture is of a nation no longer content to follow trade rules set elsewhere. India is writing its own.
Each agreement extends its influence into different spheres—from logistics and energy to technology and sustainability. The web of deals is not just an export strategy but an insurance policy for a world of shifting alliances. Mahajan explains that old globalisation chased scale while the new one prizes trust and diversification.
India’s bet is that in an era of fractured supply chains and contested technologies, trust will be the new tariff advantage. The ‘India-plus-many’ strategy is built for that world—flexible, networked and anchored in sovereignty. Far from retreating, India has re-entered the global trade arena on its own terms. And this time, it is setting the rules.
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